Real time fault injection using on chip debug infrastructures: a case study by André Fidalgo et al.

  
 
Abstract— As electronic devices get smaller and more complex, 
dependability assurance is becoming fundamental for many 
mission critical computer based systems. This paper presents a 
case study on the possibility of using the on-chip debug 
infrastructures present in most current microprocessors to 
execute real time fault injection campaigns. The proposed 
methodology is based on a debugger customized for fault 
injection and consists of injecting bit-flip type faults on memory 
elements without modifying or halting the target application. 
Three different configurations are compared in terms of 
performance, area overhead and communication bus width. The 
basic debugger design is easily portable and applicable to 
different architectures, providing a flexible and efficient 
mechanism for verifying and validating fault tolerant 
components. 
 
Index Terms – Computer Fault Tolerance, Fault Injection, On 
Chip Debug, Reliability 
I. INTRODUCTION 
oday, most safety-critical applications require the use of 
some type of computer-based device, causing their 
implantation to grow and expand into new areas like the 
automotive and biomedical fields. However, as electronic 
systems increase in complexity and decrease in size their 
correct operating behavior is becoming harder to guarantee 
[1]. Circuits are getting more sensitive to noise and to other 
factors, with the appearance of soft errors becoming a real 
possibility even for devices used in non-hostile environments, 
making dependability a necessity for a much broader area of 
applications. Dependable systems are designed to handle 
errors that originate from software or hardware faults and to 
recover from them, while maintaining acceptable operating 
conditions. The possibly destructive nature of a failure and the 
long error latencies impair identifying the cause of failures in 
field operation and in the normal time that it takes for a failure 
to occur. To identify and understand potential errors, it is 
desirable to experiment on an actual device as to better study 
and improve its dependability. This approach can be applied 
either on the development phase, where models or prototypes 
are used, or on the deployment phase, if faults can be 
deliberately injected in useful time without damaging the 
equipment. This experiment-based approach requires 
knowledge of the system architecture and behavior, and 
especially of the mechanisms implemented to provide 
tolerance to faults, errors or failures, i.e. the events leading to 
a service failure on microprocessor based systems [2]. 
Specific instruments and tools must be used to induce these 
hazards and monitor their effects and in the case of 
microprocessor systems, access to the internal resources is of 
utmost importance. Many of today’s microprocessors provide 
such access through dedicated built-in debug circuitry, often 
designated as on-chip debug (OCD). The use of these OCD 
infrastructures for fault injection purposes is an efficient 
solution for verifying and validating fault tolerant designs. 
This paper describes recent research on real time fault 
injection targeting such devices (i.e. without halting 
application execution), based on the development and use of a 
debugger optimized for fault injection. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: the next section gives an overview of 
fault injection methodologies used on microprocessor systems 
and previous work on this area; section 3 presents the system 
used as a target, the fault injection oriented debugger and 
some proposals for enhanced fault injection support; section 4 
presents the experimental results obtained so far and finally 
section 5 discusses these results and lays the basis for future 
work. 
II. FAULT INJECTION ON MICROPROCESSORS 
A. Overview 
In microprocessor systems, the most common methodology 
to achieve dependability is the use of fault-tolerant 
components, both in hardware and software. The correct 
behavior of such components must be tested and fault 
injection can be used to (1) identify design or implementation 
faults, (2) verify & validate fault tolerance capabilities and (3) 
estimate how often failures will occur and evaluate the 
consequences of such failures. 
Fault injection is normally structured in campaigns, each 
being composed of a series of experiments during which the 
target system runs (a specific application is executed) and a 
specific fault (or set of faults) is inserted at specific trigger 
conditions. The target system behavior is monitored and 
information is recorded as comprehensively as necessary and 
possible, to later understand and evaluate the effects of the 
inserted fault(s). 
Existent microprocessor fault injection techniques are 
commonly classified in three broad groups, namely (1) 
simulation based fault injection, (2) software based fault 
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 injection (SWIFI), and (3) physical fault injection. 
Simulation based fault injection is mostly used in the early 
phases of a design when the target system exists only in model 
format. This technique requires a model of the target itself, the 
necessary simulation tools to insert faults and adequate 
processing capabilities to run the simulation [3].  
Software based fault injection consists of reproducing at a 
logical level the errors originated by physical faults using 
software commands already available on the target device. 
This allows the injection of errors on all resources accessible 
by software, like registers, program and data memory, most 
peripherals and some timers [4]. Physical fault injection is a 
more realistic approach in the sense that it tries to replicate 
real world faults. All physical techniques perform an actual 
fault insertion on the circuit or emulate their immediate 
consequences (errors) through internal or external action. 
Access to the circuit elements is usually performed either 
through specific hardware equipment [5] or using debug and 
test infrastructures included on the target chip [6]. Physical 
fault injection may also be performed without a direct 
connection between the fault injector and the system under 
test, either through laser [7], heavy-ion radiation or 
electromagnetic fields [8]. 
The hardest part of microprocessor fault injection is how to 
access those internal elements where faults are more probable, 
generally the memory elements and communication buses, 
without disturbing the running applications. OCD 
infrastructures provide access to internal resources in parallel 
with the target hardware and running software, being an 
excellent mechanism for modifying register and / or memory 
values (i.e. insert faults) and subsequently retrieve the data 
necessary for result analysis. 
The OCD facilities implemented by different families of 
processors share some common characteristics that form a 
core feature set, which usually includes run-control, 
breakpoint support and memory and register access. Some 
devices include more advanced features like watchpoints, 
program trace and real time debugging capabilities. In general, 
an OCD is a combination of hardware and software on the 
microprocessor chip that requires some external hardware to 
be used, the basic requirement being some kind of 
communication link between the chip and the host machine. 
The access to the OCD infrastructure is made through an 
interface port usually requiring an external debugger in 
between.  
The use of OCD infrastructures for fault injection can 
overcome some of the limitations present on other approaches. 
For instance, simulation techniques are often time-consuming 
and may lead to erroneous results as they are intrinsically 
dependant on the quality of the available model. SWIFI 
techniques require modifications to the running code, which in 
fact modifies the target system, and coverage is limited to the 
resources accessible by software. Most physical fault injection 
techniques are expensive and precise control of the instant and 
location of a fault is often very difficult or even impossible. In 
most cases, OCD fault injection techniques rely on halting the 
processor, either by the use of control signals or breakpoints, 
and subsequently modifying the targeted registers or memory 
locations to insert the intended faults. When available, trace 
capabilities provide an efficient mean to monitor fault 
propagation and effects. 
B. Previous Work 
As a technological solution, a major problem with OCD is 
the lack of a consistent set of capabilities and a standard 
communications interface across processor architectures. An 
industry consortium has been working on the establishment of 
a standard for OCD, which is still on a proposal phase and is 
formally designated as “IEEE-ISTO 5001, The NEXUS 5001 
Forum Standard for a Global Embedded Processor Debug 
Interface” [9]. If widely adopted, it may be possible to employ 
the same debugger to access the core of multiple processor 
architectures and to use a similar set of debugging features for 
all. Additionally, the feature set that this standard proposes for 
the higher classes of compliance provides a useful set of tools 
for real time fault injection in the form real time access to 
memory and on-the-fly program and data trace. 
Experimental work has been done in our research group and 
in the DISCA-UPV [10] to evaluate the possibilities of 
executing real-time fault injection on a NEXUS compliant 
microprocessor. The target systems used were based on a 
Motorola MPC565 CPU [11], which is a commercial 32 bit 
microcontroller with widespread use on the automotive 
industry. In our case, the debugger used was an iSystems 
IC3000 [12] (iTracePro version) and its integrated debugging 
software Winidea 2005. This software allows direct control of 
the debugger and the use of scripts (running on the host 
machine) to automate the debugging tasks.  
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Fig. 1. Fault Injection Environment (MPC565) 
The fault campaigns were manually generated and 
translated into Winidea scripts. A typical fault injection 
operation would require the microprocessor to run until the 
triggering condition was met, this being signaled to the host 
machine so that it could instruct a memory access operation 
(via debugger and OCD) to inject the intended fault. The 
obtained results confirmed most of the expected potentialities 
and simultaneously identified some shortcomings both in fault 
triggering and performance. It proved possible to insert faults 
in memory space without affecting the running application 
and then use the trace information gathered as an effective 
mean to analyze program flow, before and after the actual 
fault activation. However, as all NEXUS compliant debuggers 
currently communicate with the host machine through 
Ethernet or USB connections, and as the fault campaigns must 
be run on the host machine, this imposes a bottleneck on the 
time required for an actual memory access. This fact causes 
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 the time interval required for reading a memory cell contents 
and writing back a modified value to be measured in 
milliseconds. This delay allows the initial data to be 
overwritten by the application running on the target system, 
the magnitude of the problem depending of the running 
application and memory position targeted. An additional 
problem is the triggering of a fault. Both the described 
problems are not directly related with the OCD capabilities 
but rather with the available tools, which lack some features 
that, not being necessary for debug, would be very useful for 
fault injection. The probability of the running application 
overwriting the targeted cell during the fault injection process 
can be minimized by reducing the writing delay of the fault 
injection process. The triggering delay problem can be solved 
by adding reactive behavior to the debugger so that it can 
perform a write operation on the detection of a specific signal 
or message from the target system. This issue can be 
addressed by a debugger with the required capabilities and 
interfaces. 
III. CASE STUDY 
A. Target System 
The use of a NEXUS compliant debugger benefits from the 
useful features defined in this standard and increases the area 
of immediate applicability of the developed concepts and 
solutions. As neither the actual compatible CPUs nor the 
commercial debuggers are easily modifiable, the reported case 
study requires (1) an alternative microprocessor core where a 
compliant OCD infrastructure could be implemented and (2) a 
customized debugger, as specific libraries are required for 
each target. The OCD and the debugger itself were developed 
as two distinct VHDL modules, aiming to keep them simple 
and easily portable to maintain a high level of compatibility 
with different target architectures. In this way a complete 
proof-of-concept solution was tested and the requirements for 
its migration to different systems were evaluated.   
The cpugenerator [13] building tool was selected to create 
the different microprocessor targets. It is publicly available 
through opencores [14] and allows the automatic creation of 4, 
8, 16 or 32 bit RISC microprocessor cores, being possible to 
configure several parameters like bus type, interrupt support 
and memory configuration. The OCD version implemented on 
the target system is NEXUS Class 2 compliant and provides 
some customization features, to be compatible with different 
CPU configurations with only minor adjustments. It is 
possible to define the data bus width (input and output) and 
the internal FIFOs used to store data prior to its decoding or 
communication. These parameters are very important as they 
may constrain the capabilities of the OCD in terms of trace 
and real time access. On the other hand, the use of larger 
buses can significantly increase the logic overhead imposed 
by the OCD infrastructure. The target application for testing is 
a matrix_addFT program, which is a fault tolerant version of a 
matrix adder. The fault tolerance is achieved by duplicating 
each arithmetic operation and then comparing the obtained 
results, with any difference triggering an error detection 
routine. Although not as powerful as hardware fault tolerance, 
this solution allows for some degree of dependability without 
modifications to the hardware, at the cost of memory space 
and some performance penalty.  
The NEXUS standard defines a minimum set of debugging 
features, the interface port and the communication protocol. 
The implemented features include all common OCD features 
plus real time access to memory. The interface with the 
outside world is made using the AUX port option, which 
provides two message data buses for OCD data input and 
output along with independent clock and control signals. Two 
additional event pins allow halting the processor and provide 
exact timing for watchpoint / breakpoint signaling.  The 
communication protocol followed the NEXUS standard spec, 
with all mandatory messages being included and two 
additional optional messages added for internal register access 
and OCD configuration. 
B. Fault Injection Environment 
The selected fault model is the one used in most common 
fault scenarios for microprocessor based critical systems [15] 
and consists of single bit-flip faults in random memory 
elements at also random moments during the application 
execution. The actual fault trigger can be any instruction 
occurrence of the running application, covering the entire 
execution time. The fault location can be any resource 
accessible for writing through the OCD, including memory 
and internal registers (real time access is only possible when 
targeting memory). 
All experiments are structured into fault injection 
campaigns, each one defining a set of fault injection 
operations where specific fault coordinates (location x value) 
and trigger condition are selected. In each such operation the 
processor is reset and the application runs from start. Each 
campaign is generated by an external tool and then described 
as a script with the necessary messages to be sent to the OCD 
infrastructure, both for configuration and data collection. 
Initialization is performed by loading the application into 
memory and setting up the OCD infrastructure as required by 
the specific operation. The target memory value at the moment 
of the injection must be determined beforehand, using either 
the knowledge of the running application code or a prior 
faultless execution up to the fault triggering instant and then 
using the OCD to read the relevant memory cell contents. In 
this manner it is possible to determine the value that should be 
stored so that a single bit-flip is caused on the target with a 
single write operation. The fault trigger condition is selected 
from the executed application code and can be any event that 
triggers a watchpoint, like an instruction execution or a data 
access. A normal fault injection scenario consists of the 
NEXUS compliant target microprocessor, the debugger 
running the fault campaigns and the host machine being used 
for set up and data analysis. This is presented in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2. Fault Injection Environment (Case Study) 
The main advantage of this fault injection solution is the 
debugger capability to manage the entire fault injection 
process. Although the host machine is responsible for 
downloading the fault campaign data to the debugger and 
uploading the trace data after the fault campaign execution, 
the entire fault campaign is executed autonomously by the 
debugger. Additionally, if the target system is implemented on 
a FPGA device it is possible to add the debugger (and all 
relevant fault campaign data) as a module implemented on the 
same device, with the inherent advantages in terms of 
performance and cost. 
Each fault injection operation consists of loading the 
debugger input memory with a series of instructions 
describing the steps required for its execution. After the initial 
set up is completed, the debugger waits for the triggering 
condition to be met, which will be signaled by a watchpoint 
hit signal or by a breakpoint hit message. When either of these 
events occurs the debugger sends a message to the OCD 
instructing it to write into the target memory position the 
intended faulty value. Although the debugger allows an 
instantaneous reaction, the actual fault insertion requires the 
transmission and decoding (by the OCD) of at least one 
complete message (the write command and data). During the 
entire operation the output memory records the trace messages 
that are sent by the OCD, to allow a subsequent program flow 
reconstruction and fault effect analysis. From these messages 
it is possible to diagnose fault effects, verifying if the fault 
was acknowledged by the error detection routine, and after the 
application runs its course it is possible to use the OCD to 
check if all final results are correct. All set up steps can be 
done with the target processor running normally, but the fault 
activation may only take place after this set up is performed. 
The program trace is not affected and operates normally 
before, during and after the fault injection process, reacting 
exactly as if a “real” fault occurred.  
C. Debugger 
The debugger is presented in Fig. 3 and consists of a 
debugger core connected to two memory banks (input and 
output) and to a NEXUS debug port. All elements were 
designed to optimize the execution of fault injection 
operations with emphasis on execution speed. 
 
Fig. 3. Debugger 
The debugger core is a simple processor type device that 
fetches commands from the input memory, controls execution 
and manages the data flow and possible error conditions. 
Direct control is possible through specific signals (DLINK) 
which may replace either the input or output memories (or 
both) as source of commands and destination of data. The 
access to the input memory, for reading purposes, is 
controlled by the debugger core and executed sequentially. 
Table I displays a list of available commands and the 
corresponding parameters. 
Table I 
Debugger Commands and Parameters 
MNEMONIC PARAM DESCRIPTION 
HALT None Halts the target microprocessor execution and enters DEBUG mode. 
RUN None Starts or resumes the target microprocessor execution. 
RESET None Resets the target microprocessor. 
DRESET None 
Resets the debugger, restarting 
command fetch from the initial input 
memory position. 
DCONFIG <code> Configures the debugger according to the <code> parameter. 
WAIT <time> Waits for a number of clock cycles defined by the <time> parameter. 
WAITFOR <event> <time> 
Waits for a specific message or a 
watchpoint hit signal from the target 
OCD, during a specific period of 
time. The messages can be any 
response or trace message. 
READRAM <address> Reads the contents of the memory cell at the specified address. 
WRITERAM <address> <data> 
Writes a byte of data to the memory 
cell at the specified address. 
READREG <address> Reads the contents of a register at the specified address. 
WRITEREG <address> <data> 
Writes a byte of data to the register 
at the specified address. 
The output memory is used to store data for subsequent 
program flow analysis. The type of information stored can be 
selected by configuring the debugger and depends on the task 
at hand and available memory. The NEXUS port is managed 
by a communication controller responsible for translating 
commands into messages to be sent and retrieving the 
messages received from the OCD. The width of the data buses 
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 defines the duration of the transmission required by each 
message.   
D. Performance Improvements  
The fault injection procedure described on the previous 
subsections was planed with the double objective of 
improving the performance and maintaining the highest level 
of compatibility with different target microprocessor 
architectures. It is possible to improve performance even 
further by modifying the OCD infrastructure present on the 
target microprocessor. Two approaches requiring 
modifications to the OCD were tested, namely (1) the 
simplification of the communication between the debugger 
and the OCD and (2) the migration of the reactive behavior to 
the OCD infrastructure itself. The first approach implies 
modifications to both the OCD and the debugger and consists 
of removing the NEXUS interface on both modules and 
connecting the debugger directly to the OCD interface signals, 
as displayed in Fig. 4. 
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Target CPU
Parallel
LinkData
 Link
 
Fig. 4. Parallel Linking 
In this approach the NEXUS communication manager is 
replaced by some glue-logic enabling parallel access to the 
OCD interface, with all required signals being accessible for 
reading (or writing) on a single clock cycle. In our case study 
the parallel link width varies between 34 and 106 bits, 
depending on implemented features and internal bus widths. 
The main modification is the elimination of the coding and 
decoding of the NEXUS messages and the inherent delay 
induced by those steps. However, this approach can only be 
applied either in simulation or using a special version of the 
target system and implies the loss of standardization and a 
considerable increase in the communications port width. The 
second approach is described in more detail in [16] and 
consists of adding an extra module to the OCD infrastructure 
in order to allow it to control part of the fault injection 
process. In this alternative the debugger and the NEXUS 
interface are unchanged, the differences being in the sequence 
of commands used for each fault injection operation as the 
actual triggering of the fault and memory writing operations 
are executed by the enhanced OCD itself. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The target system, the debugger and the different memories 
were designed as VHDL models using the ISE 7.1i 
development environment [17] and simulated using the 
Modelsim 6.0a simulation engine. Three different OCD 
implementations were used with a common 32 bit CPU 
configuration, as summarized in Table II. The MPC565 is 
included for comparison purposes, the values representing the 
best possible configuration.  
Table II 
Target System Configurations 
Configuration CLK (MHz) 
MDI 
(bits) 
MDO 
(bits) 
OCD_Normal 25 2 bits 8 bits 
OCD_Extended 25 4 bits 8 bits 
OCD_Parallel 25 Parallel Link (72 bits) 
MPC565 40 2 bits 8 bits 
The OCD_Normal and OCD_Extended configurations vary 
in terms of port width and on the size of the internal message 
buffers, with MDI being the Message Data In bus and MDO 
the Message Data Out bus. OCD_Normal represents a 
configuration equivalent to the best available for the MPC565 
microprocessor and OCD_Extended represents an improved 
configuration for faster memory writing. The OCD_Parallel 
configuration replaces the NEXUS communication elements 
present on the OCD by synchronous access to the OCD input 
signals and requires a special version of the debugger. All 
configurations include separate ROM and RAM banks on the 
target system, the first for storing the program code and the 
later for application data. The fault campaigns were structured 
as follows: 
 The OCD is configured once at the beginning of the 
campaign, with the configuration depending on the fault 
injection target (memory or registers). Each campaign is 
loaded into memory and the experiments are executed 
sequentially with the target CPU being RESET between 
experiments. 
 The instruction address that triggers each fault injection is 
randomly generated from the actually executed ROM 
space and the target memory position is randomly selected 
from the actually used RAM space. 
 The results are retrieved after all the experiments are 
complete and their analysis is performed externally with 
each experiment being diagnosed, to check if the final 
results are correct and if the fault was detected by the fault 
tolerance routine. 
The simulation of about 100 fault campaigns repeated for 
each configuration returned the results presented in Table III. 
In this table inconclusive results represent experiments that 
had to be discarded due to incongruent trace data, and fault 
injection delay represents the time interval between the 
meeting of the trigger condition and the actual insertion of the 
faulty value as obtained from the simulation waveforms. 
Table III 
Fault Injection Results 
Configuration Normal Extended Parallel 
Inconclusive Results 4% 3% 0% 
Fault Injection Delay 
(In Clock Cycles) 38 21 3 
Some conclusions, relative to the fault injection process, are 
possible at this stage: 
 It wouldn’t be possible to execute the same fault 
campaigns (on real time) on a system using an MPC565 
and a commercial controller as the reaction delay would 
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 be to high for this particular application (the total 
execution time is less than the interval required for 
injecting a single fault). 
 When targeting memory in real time, some experiments 
return inconclusive results because the CPU writes on 
the memory cell being targeted before the fault is 
actually inserted.  
 The width of the communication channel between the 
debugger and the OCD clearly affects the performance of 
the fault injection process, with the use of larger buses 
reducing the occurrence of inconclusive results. 
The number of equivalent gates for each module and each 
target configuration is given by Table IV.  
Table IV 
Area Overhead (in Logic Gates) 
Module Normal Extended Parallel 
CPU core 53717 53717 53717 
OCD 17601 18801 15211 
Debugger 
(except RAM) 992 1079 820 
From the above values it is possible to confirm that a simple 
debugger (tasked only with fault injection campaigns 
management and results storage) requires comparatively little 
space on a programmable device. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Dependability evaluation efforts sometimes neglect the 
possibilities of powerful OCD infrastructures present on the 
target device, even knowing that their use as a mean to 
execute non-intrusive real-time fault injection campaigns is 
often the best solution in terms of performance and 
capabilities. The reasons behind this are sometimes lack of 
appropriate tools or inadequate documentation. The diversity 
of methodologies, feature implementation and interface ports 
are also a downside. Our case study shows that the use of an 
optimized debugger and an OCD with real time access 
capabilities allows the execution of fault campaigns on the 
target memory space with full coverage of the application 
execution and used resources. The possibilities in terms of 
fault triggering and fault injection delay are dependent on the 
OCD capabilities, with communication speed being the 
fundamental factor. The use of larger communications ports 
allows faster operation and therefore minimizes the risk of the 
running application interfering with the process. The use of 
direct communication between the debugger and OCD 
infrastructures allows a considerable gain in performance but 
demands an increase in the width of the communication port 
that would not be acceptable for most hardware 
implementations. Possible middle term solutions are the 
increase of the OCD port size within acceptable values or the 
migration of some features to the inside of the OCD. Both 
solutions allow better performance at the cost of some 
additional logic overhead on the target OCD circuitry. 
Ongoing work is aimed at applying the proposed solutions to 
different target architectures and fault tolerant techniques. 
Simultaneously, means to further improve performance and 
coverage are also being studied. 
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